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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals may reverse a decision 
where, due to the untimely filing of the appeal, the Appellate 
Court is deprived of jurisdiction. 
2. Whether Certiorari should be granted to review a sum-
mary decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to the non-existence 
of a partnership between the parties in the "Wine Cup Ranch". 
3. Whether Certiorari should be granted to review a sum-
mary decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's 
ruling that the parties' Decree of Divorce should not be modified 
to reallocate the parties' debts and obligations, including tax 
obligations owed the Internal Revenue Service, 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Order of Affirmance of the Court of Appeals (not for 
publication), was served upon all parties on November 20, 1987 
and is found in the Appendix hereto. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Respondent does not dispute this court's jurisdiction over 
the petition for certiorari under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-
2-2 (1953 as amended). Petitioner Monte Tipton obtained a timely 
ex parte order granting an extension of time in which to file his 
Petition of Certiorari. 
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CONTROLLING RULES 
RULE 43 CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW OF CERTIORARI 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but 
of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are 
special and important reasons therefor. The following, while 
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Court's discretion, 
indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of the 
Court of Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a 
question of state of federal law in a way that is in conflict 
with a decision of this Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a de-
cision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a 
departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of this 
Court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, 
but should be settled by this Court. 
Rule 43, R. Utah S. Ct. 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Given the nature of a petition for certiorari, Petitioner 
Monte Dee Tipton is required to present special and important 
reasons why review by this court is merited. Respondent Celia 
Tipton respectfully submits that no compelling reasons for cer-
tiorari exist. To the contrary, Respondent's jurisdictional, 
equitable and legal defenses serve to establish that certiorari 
is not appropriate under these circumstances. 
A persistent obstacle to appellate review, both by the Utah 
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Court of Appeals, and now by this court in the context of a pe-
tition for certiorari, is the lack of a complete or adequate re-
cord of proceedings below. At the April 5, 1985 "trial" for di-
vorce, both parties submitted packages of documentary evidence, 
lists of issues, and other materials to the trial judge, the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya. All of the "evidence" upon which 
Judge Sawaya ruled consisted of proffered testimony and documen-
tary evidence which was never included as part of the official 
clerk's record. Respondent refuses to accept the burden properly 
placed on Petitioner Monte Tipton to provide a sufficient record 
to permit the kind of appellate review he now seeks. (See e.g., 4 
Am. Jur. 2d "Appeal and Error", Section 409, p.870.) 
Although Respondent Celia Tipton denies the factual exposi-
tion set forth in Monte Tipton's petition for writ of certiorari, 
the total inadequacy of the formal record, noted above, the na-
ture of a petition of writ of certiorari,! discussed below, and 
the untimeliness of Monte Tipton's prior appeal all argue against 
a detailed listing or disapproval of the asserted "facts" pre-
sented by Monte Tipton. 
ARGUMENT AGAINST ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
I. 
CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED WITHOUT 
SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, set forth in 
its entirety above, recognizes that review by certiorari is not a 
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matter of right but of discretion. In Bocrcres v. Morris, 635 P.2d 
39 (Utah 1981), decided before the establishment of our present 
two tiered appellate system, the discretionary nature of the writ 
for certiorari was noted by this court. Pursuant to Rule 43 it 
is the burden of a petitioner to establish "special and important 
reasons" for the issuance of a writ. The petition presently be-
fore this court meets none of the illustrative criteria for cer-
tiorari found in subdivisions (1) through (4) of Rule 43 and 
Monte Tipton can offer no other "special" or "important" reason 
why he should be afforded an extra level of appellate review. 
Given the untimeliness of Monte Tipton's previous appeal, a 
jurisdictional fact which is, in itself, fatal to Monte Tipton's 
present petition, further appellate review is inappropriate. 
II. 
PETITIONER MONTE DEE TIPTON'S 
PREVIOUS APPEAL WAS UNTIMELY 
The addendum contains an abbreviated chronology of events 
and previous court orders which serve to establish that the Order 
of Affirmance of the Utah Court of Appeals was entirely proper on 
jurisdictional grounds. Monte Tipton simply delayed too long be-
fore seeking Appellate review. Under the circumstances, certior-
ari is totally inappropriate. 
The events from May 9, 1985 are particularly significant. 
Both the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Order 
relating to the same, which are the principle subject of this 
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Petition, were entered by Judge Sawaya on May 9, 1985. Monte 
Tipton's May 2 0 Motion for New Trial, etc. tolled the time for 
appeal from Judge Sawaya's Order, Findings and Conclusions 
(U.R.A.P. 4(b)). 
Following a hearing before the trial court on the Motion for 
New Trial, etc., Judge Sawaya executed and entered his Order de-
nying Monte Tipton's various motions. That Order was entered by 
the court clerk in the docket sheet on September 23, 1985 and 
mailed to all counsel. It contained no directions for any party 
to prepare another order for the court, nor were findings and 
conclusions necessary. 
As recognized in U.R.C.P. 58 A(c) "A judgment is complete 
and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation 
of a lien on real property, when the same is signed and filed as 
herein provided." As Rule 54 (a) notes, the term "'judgment' ... 
includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies." En-
try of Judge Sawayafs order on September 23, 1985 commenced the 
running of Monte Tipton's time to appeal (U.R.A.P. 4(b): "The 
time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the 
order denying a new trial or granting or denying any such other 
motion."). 
Monte Tipton himself recognized the appealability of Judge 
Sawaya's September 23, 1985 order in the first Notice of Appeal 
which he filed months later — on April 19, 1986. By that time, 
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Monte Tipton's right to appeal had already expired (U.R.A.P. 4). 
Celia Tipton's filing of a redundant and duplicative Order on May 
20, 1986 did not serve to extend the time to appeal. As recog-
nized in Larsen v. Larsen 657 P. 2d 1350, 1351 (Utah 1983), a 
case involving duplicative, and redundant, judgments, the time 
for appeal runs from the first judgment or order. 
III. 
CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED TO REVIEW 
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S AFFIRMANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. The Trial Court's Findings and Order that Monte Tipton and 
Celia Tipton Were Not Partners is Correct and Adequate. 
Given the absence of affirmative evidence by Monte Tipton as 
to the alleged "partnership", affirmance by the Court of Appeal 
of the trial court's finding concerning partnership should stand. 
The effective limits upon a trial judge's findings and conclu-
sions were noted by this court in Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 
673 P. 2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983) and Pearson v. Pearson 561 P.2d 
1080, 1082 (Utah 1977). 
Celia Tipton does not dispute the statements of her counsel, 
Richard B. McKeown, or counsel for Monte Tipton, Peter W. Guyon, 
set forth at length at pages 13 through 16 of the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. Such proffered testimony, including Celia 
Tipton's denial of the non-existence of a supposed "partnership", 
effectively deprived the trial judge of the ability to conclude 
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that a partnership actually existed. Without adequate affirma-
tive evidence of a partnership, Judge Sawaya gave that issue all 
the attention it deserved in his Findings and Conclusions. In 
this regard, it should be kept in mind that Monte Tipton himself 
prepared and executed the stipulation containing the very proper-
ty distribution provisions of which he now complains (See, Ab-
breviated Chronology in Addendum, entry of 03-04-83). 
In considering the existence of a partnership between the 
parties, the absence of a presumption in fayor of such a finding, 
and the burden of proof upon Petitioner Monte Tipton, is clear: 
The existence of a partnership will not be presumed, 
but must be proved... In accord with the general prin-
ciple that the burden of proof to establish the affir-
mative of an issue involved in an action rests upon the 
party alleging the facts constituting that issue, the 
burden of proving the existence of a partnership is or-
dinarily on him who alleges and relies on the fact of 
its existence and this rule applies to one who alleges 
a partnership by estoppel as well as to one who at-
tempts to establish a partnership as between the par-
ties to the action. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, "Partnership", 
Section 80, p. 993-994. 
In this regard, the lack of a written partnership agreement 
or any other documentary evidence initiated by Monte Tipton is 
significant. The New York Supreme Court ruled in Hanlon v. Mel-
fi, 423 N.Y.S. 2d 132, 134 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1979): 
A partnership is an association of two or more persons 
to place their money, efforts, labor or skill, or some 
or all of these in lawful commerce for business and to 
divide the profits and bear the loss in certain propor-
tions (citation omitted). The fact that there is no 
written agreement of partnership is not conclusive in 
determining whether or not a partnership exists but it 
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is an element to be taken into serious consideration in 
determining where the thrust of the controversy is. 
Where no partnership agreement is executed in writing 
by the parties, it must be determined from the testi-
mony, from the conduct of the parties, and especially 
from the documentary evidence, whether or not a part-
nership existed. The burden, of course, of establish-
ing the existence of an oral partnership by a fair pre-
ponderance of the credible evidence rests upon the 
party claiming the partnership (citation omitted). It 
has further been held that an indispensable requirement 
of a partnership is a mutual promise or understanding 
of the parties to share in the profits of the business 
and submit to the burden of making good the losses, 
(citations omitted). 
Monte Tipton's bald assertion that a property settlement 
provision creates a partnership between himself and his former 
wife strains credulity. No "effort, labor or skill" was ever 
contributed to this partnership by the Respondent. The property 
settlement provision in question spoke of a distribution of mon-
ies to be generated from a note, but was totally silent about any 
distribution of losses. There was no venture engaged in by this 
supposed partnership. It is also clear that the mere division of 
monies owed under a note does not constitute "a share of the pro-
ceeds of a business" as defined by Section 48-1-4(4) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). 
Respondent respectfully submits the trial court's conclusion 
was inescapable. The parties' joint involvement was limited to a 
single transaction, the payment of a debt through division of 
proceeds from a note, not an on-going business venture (Cf. Koes-
lincr v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah 1975). Celia Tipton 
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contributed neither property nor services (Cf. Kimball v. McCor-
nick, 259 P. 313, 314 (Utah 1927). There was no meeting of the 
minds on a business, orally or in writing, (Cf. Johanson Brothers 
Builders v. Board of Review, Industrial Coiitmission, 222 P.2d 563, 
567 (Utah 1950). For these reasons, Judge Sawaya appropriately 
rejected Appellant's partnership claim as an afterthought induced 
by his continued difficulty with the IRS. 
B. The Court of Appeals Properly Affirmed, Summarily, the Trial 
Judge's Refusal to Modify the Parties' Decree of Divorce. 
Concerning Monte Tipton's claim of inadequate written find-
ings, the Respondent hereby incorporates by reference her pre-
vious discussion found above. Again, Respondent submits that the 
sparsity of the trial court's findings was largely mandated by 
Monte Tipton's own inability to present evidence in support of 
his position. Contrary to Monte Tipton's bald assertions, the 
trial court's decision as to a lack of "changed circumstances" 
was entirely in line with previous decisions of this court. For 
example, in Foulcrer v. Foulcrer, 626 P. 2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981) it 
was held: [ 
The change in circumstance required to justify a mod-
ification of the Decree of Divorce varies with the type 
of modification contemplated... Where a disposition of 
real property is in question however, the court should 
properly be more reluctant to grant a modification. In 
the interest of securing stability of titles, modifica-
tions in a decree of divorce, making distribution of 
real property, are to be granted only upon a showing of 
compelling reasons arising from a substantial and mat-
erial change of circumstances. 
9 
The above holds true a fortiori where the property dis-
position is the product of an agreement and stipulation 
between the parties, and sanctioned by the trial 
court. Such a provision is the product of an agreement 
bargained for by the parties. As such, a trial court 
should subsequently modify such a provision only with 
great reluctance, and based upon compelling reason. 
Absent such substantial change, a divorce decree cannot be colla-
terally attacked due to the doctrine of res judicata. Kessimakis 
v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978). 
The Court of Appeals1 Order of Affirmance effectively dis-
proved Monte Tipton's claim that his tax liability was something 
he could not have known. Parenthetically, it should be observed 
the Respondent Celia Tipton engaged her own tax expert to advise 
her as to the tax consequences of the proposed property settle-
ment stipulation. In addition, well known Utah authorities have 
spoken of the need to consider the tax consequences of marital 
property settlements for some time. The following excerpt from 
the Summary of Utah Family Law, Journal of Legal Studies, (1980) 
B.Y.U., Section 12.18, p. 311, is illustrative: 
The tax consequences of the property settlement need to 
be analyzed carefully. Alimony is often taxable to re-
cipient and deductible to the payor. Division of the 
marital estate may give rise to a tax liability because 
of the liquidation of the assets. In some situations, 
transfer of assets between spouses upon divorce may 
trigger a taxable event. An award of real property 
will normally include a corresponding property tax 
obligation. 
Monte Tipton's failure to consider these matters is rendered 
even more inexcusable in light of his admitted history of contro-
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versy with the Internal Revenue Service. At the trial he admit-
ted disputes with the IRS years before he proposed the property 
settlement agreement which he now would like to rewrite: 
Now, there is another circumstance that Mr. Tipton 
would testify to, and that is that he had previous1 
problems with the Internal Revenue Service because of 
the nature of his business and I will try to give the 
Court an outline a little later on if I can. Right now 
let me state that in 1980 Mr. Tipton settled with the 
Internal Revenue Service a $271,000 claim they had 
against him for $162,000... (R.T. p. 20, lines 7-14). 
Amazingly, Monte Tipton's proffered testimony at trial was 
that at the time that he proposed the property settlement agree-
ment to Celia Tipton, he was aware of tax consequences, general-
ly, and believed that he was taking care of them: 
But in any event, during 1978 through 1982, he (Monte 
Tipton) continued to accrue certain tax liabilities 
which he in his own mind felt he was taking care of by 
investment tax credits and other vehicles. 
(R.T. p. 21, lines 2-5.) 
C. The Trial Court's Ruling On Modification, Affirmed by The 
Court of Appeals, Is Supported by Weighty Principles of 
Equity. 
1. Principles of Compromise Supported the Trial Court's 
Denial of Modification. 
The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement prepared by Peti-
tioner's counsel included provisions concerning property settle-
ment that, according to paragraph 9 thereof, were intended to be 
"complete and final." In paragraph 11 thereof, both parties 
declared: 
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It is understood and agreed to by the parties hereto 
that this agreement constitutes a complete, fair and 
equitable settlement of any claims the Plaintiff Celia 
Sherwood Tipton has or may have against any and all 
property, whether the same be real or personal, owned 
by Defendant Monte D. Tipton or which Defendant Monte 
D. Tipton may have an interest... 
The provisions of paragraphs 13 and 14, cited below, high-
lighted the fact that both parties understood that they were 
agreeing to compromise all claims that they might have had 
against the other: 
It is understood by both parties that Plaintiff's 
claims against all property, real or personal, owed by 
Defendant, prior to, during, or subsequent to the par-
ties' marriage, are disputed and that the instant 
agreement is entered into for the purpose of settling 
all such disputed claims... 
Both parties enter this agreement of their own free 
will and choice, and assert that they do so willingly 
and that they are fully aware of the ramifications of 
this agreement... 
Under Hornbook principles relating to the public policy be-
hind settlement agreements, and their effect, Monte Tipton's de-
mand to re-write his agreement should be denied. 
The law favors the resolution of controversies and un-
certainties through compromise and settlement rather 
than through litigation, and it is the policy of the 
law to uphold and enforce such contracts if they are 
fairly made and are not in contradiction of some law or 
public policy. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, "Compromise and Set-
tlement", Section 5, p. 777. 
Once the parties have entered into an agreement set-
tling a disputed claim, neither party will, in the ab-
sence of any element of fraud or bad faith, be permit-
ted to repudiate it. Id, Section 7, p.779. 
Indeed, a principle related to the concept of compromise and 
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settlement provides that the acceptance of the benefits of a de-
cree precludes a party from appealing the same: 
A party who accepts an award or legal advantage under 
an order, judgment or decree, ordinarily waives his 
right to any such review of the adjudication as may 
again put in issue his right to the benefit which he 
has accepted. This is so even though the judgment, de-
cree or order may have been generally unfavorable to 
the Appellant. Whether a party who accepted benefits 
under a judgment actually intended to waive his right 
to appeal is, as a general rule, immaterial. 4 Am. 
Jur. 2d, "Appeal and Error," Section 250, pp. 745-746. 
Monte Tipton's tardy discovery that he had miscalculated his 
tax obligations is no reason to excuse him from his own agree-
ment. 
2. Principles of Contract Construction Supported Denial of 
Appellant's Request for Modification. 
The settlement agreement incorporated in the Decree of Di-
vorce provided that Respondent should receive "a fifty per cent 
(50%) partnership share of the balance due to the parties hereto 
from the Sierra Pacific note...". Any ambiguity should be con-
strued against Petitioner as the drafter of the agreement. The 
rule and rational is well explained in tl>e Restatement of Con-
tracts, Second, Section 206: 
In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise 
or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is gener-
ally preferred which operates against the party who 
supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise 
proceeds. Comment: a. Rationale. Where one party 
chooses the terms of a contract, he is likely to pro-
vide more carefully for the protection of his own in-
terests than for those of the other party. He is also 
more likely than the other party to have reason to know 
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of uncertainties of meaning. Indeed, he may leave 
meaning deliberately obscure, intending to decide at a 
later date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt, 
therefore, so long as other factors are not decisive, 
there is substantial reason for preferring the meaning 
of the other party. 
This court long ago recognized, in such cases as Twiggs 
v. The State Board of Land Cfrs, 75 P. 729 (Utah 1904), that as 
between two innocent parties to an agreement, the party whose 
conduct caused the loss should bear the loss. 
It is an equitable principle that where litigants as-
sert conflicting claims, and hence, loss or prejudice 
must be born by one of them, the decision in the event 
that they are shown to have been equally 'innocent1 — 
that is, ignorant of the harmful consequences of their 
acts — must be rendered against the party whose con-
duct brought about the prejudicial situation. In this 
respect it is frequently said that where one of two in-
nocent parties must suffer, he through his agency the 
loss occurred must bear it. Similarly, it is often 
said that where one of two parties, both guiltless of 
intentional wrong, must suffer a loss, the one whose 
conduct, act, or omission occasions the loss, must 
stand the consequences. 27 Am. Jur. 2d "Equity", Sec-
tion 146, pp. 682-683. 
3. Modification of a Property Settlement Contract Should 
Not be Permitted for Unilateral Mistake. 
Although Respondent is not aware of any Utah decisions which 
even approximate the case here presented, a Colorado appellate 
court was called upon to decide whether a United States Tax Court 
determination, adverse to the husband with respect to the payment 
of maintenance, was sufficient grounds to modify a maintenance 
and property settlement agreement. Re Marriage of Hall, 681 P. 
2d 543 (Colo. App. 1984). After considering rules relating to 
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the interpretation of contracts, as well as the existence of a 
valid "integration clause" (substantially identical with the one 
drafted by the Appellant, R. 14, Par. 25) the Colorado Court 
ruled as follows: 
Where no question of fraud, bad faith or inequitable 
conduct is involved, and the claim of a right to reform 
a contract is [based] solely on a mistake, it is abso-
lutely necessary that the mistake be mutual, and that 
both parties understood the contract to be different 
from what it shows on its face, and that the interest 
of the contract would have been different except for a 
mistake. (citation omitted). A party's prediction or 
judgment as to events to occur in the future, even if 
erroneous, is not a 'mistake1 for the purpose of making 
a contract voidable. Restatement Second of Contracts, 
Section 151c. 
Of similar relevance, Mr. Justice Traynor of the California 
Supreme Court authored a carefully reasoned examination of the 
issue of modification of a property settlement decree on the 
basis of subsequently discovered tax liability. In Kulchar 
v. Kulchar 462 P. 2d 17, 20 (Cal 1969), Mr. Justice Traynor 
considered what kinds of mistake justify modification of property 
settlements: 
Moreover, a mutual mistake that might be sufficient to 
set aside a contract is not sufficient to set aside a 
final judgment. The principles of res judicata demand 
that the parties present their entire case in one pro-
ceeding. 'Public policy requires that pressure be 
brought upon litigants to use great care in preparing 
cases for trial and in ascertaining all the facts. A 
rule which would permit the re-opening of cases pre-
viously decided because of error or ignorance during 
the progress of the trial would in a large measure 
vitiate the effects of the rules of res judicata.' 
(Rest., Judgments, Section 126, com. a). Courts deny 
relief, therefore, when the fraud or mistake is ' in-
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trinsic'; that is, when it 'goes to the merits of the 
prior proceedings, which should have been guarded 
against by the Plaintiff at that time.' (Citations 
omitted.) 
Significantly, in Kulchar., both parties agreed that a mis-
take had been made as to the tax consequences of their property 
settlement agreement. In our case, however, Respondent has re-
peatedly denied that any mistake occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the "special and important reasons" for certiorari 
required by Rule 43 are present here. The Order of Affirmance of 
the Utah Court of Appeals was entirely appropriate on the basis 
of Monte Tipton's jurisdictional failure to file a timely appeal. 
However, looking at the arguments raised in the petition for cer-
tiorari itself, it is clear that the trial court's decisions, af-
firmed on appeal, are correct and appropriate in all necessary 
respects. Plaintiff and Respondent Celia Tipton respectfully 
urges this court to deny Monte Tipton's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE 
SSXJUJ 
Richard B. McKeowr 
Attorney for Plaint i f f -Respondent 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC^ 
I hereby certify that four copies of the above and foregoing 
were hand delivered this 18 th day of February, 1988 to the 
following: 
Peter W. Guyon 
GUYON & HUNTER 
Attorneys at Law 
330 East 400 South, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
bbMji/j %ib& 
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APPENDIX 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
Celia Sherwood Tipton, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v* 
Monte Dee Tipton, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Orrae, Davidson and Greenwood (On Rule 31 Panel) 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 860205-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 31 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Double 
costs are awarded to respondent under Rule 33(a) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. O'Brien v. Rush, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 
18, 20-21 (Ct. App. 1987). 
FOR THE COURT: 
Gregory K. Qrfhe, Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of November, 1987, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Affirmance was mailed to each 
of the following: 
Peter W. Guyon, Esq* 
Guyon & Guyon 
1000 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Richard B. McKeown, Esq. 
Parker McKeown & McConkie 
505 East 200 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Hon. James S. Sawaya. 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
Dist. Ct. #D82-3162 
Julia CV-tfhitfield 
Case Management Clerk 
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ADDENDUM 
ABBREVIATED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND PLEADINGS 
DATE EVENT/PLEADING 
10-29-78 Celia Sherwood Tipton, now known as Celia 
Demman, and Monte Dee Tipton married. 
08-06-82 Plaintiff and Respondent herein, Celia 
Tipton, filed her Complaint for Divorce. 
LO-22-82 Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, pre-
pared by counsel for Petitioner Monte Tipton, 
filed for both parties with consent of Celia!s 
counsel. 
32-08-83 Minute Entry of Divorce pursuant to Stipula-
tion made by Judge Bryant H. Croft. 
33-04-83 Findings and Conclusions, drafted by Respon-
dent's Counsel, filed with the Court. 
33-04-83 Decree of Divorce signed by Judge Croft. 
04-04-83 (Right to Appeal Decree of Divorce expires) 
09-21-84 Respondent Celia Tipton filed her Motion for 
Order to Show Cause against Monte Tipton for 
failure to comply with the terms of the Decree 
of Divorce. 
LO-29-84 Petitioner Monte Tipton filed his Verified 
Motion to Dismiss; Order to Show Cause: For 
Contempt; For Judgment Against Plaintiff: 
And For Other Relief. 
32-22-85 Petitioner Monte Tipton filed his Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce. 
33-04-85 Following oral argument, Commissioner Sandra 
Peuler filed written recommendations as to 
all pending motions by all parties. Specifi-
cally, the Commissioner found that Petitioner 
should bear the tax liability which forms the 
basis for his Petition for Certiorari. 
REFERENCE 
Complaint 
for Divorce 
R.2. 
R. 2 - 6 . 
R. 7 - 1 4 
R. 15 
R. 1 6 - 2 2 . 
R. 2 3 - 2 9 . 
( U . R . A . P . 4) 
R. 3 0 - 3 1 
R. 3 9 - 4 5 
R. 4 9 - 5 2 
R. 5 9 - 6 0 
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04-05-85 Counsel for both parties appeared before Judge 
James S. Sawaya and proffered evidence relative 
to issues in dispute. The issues to be decided 
were agreed upon by stipulation. Documentary 
evidence and lay and expert testimony, was prof-
fered, but not presented to the court. 
04-2 6-85 Judge Sawaya issued a Memorandum Decision re-
solving all issues presented to him. Counsel 
for Celia Tipton is directed to prepare an Order 
for the Court's signature. 
05-09-85 Findings and Conclusions are signed by Judge 
Sawaya in support of his Memorandum Decision. 
05-09-85 Judge Sawaya signed and entered an Order fin-
alizing his Memorandum Decision. 
05-2 0-85 Counsel for Petitioner Monte Tipton filed a 
Motion for New Trial; to Take Additional 
Testimony; To Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law; and to Amend Judgment. 
(Time to appeal tolled) 
09-23-85 Counsel for both parties appear before Judge 
Sawaya to argue Monte Tipton's Rule 59 Motion 
for New Trial, etc. 
09-2 3-8 5 Judge Sawaya signed and entered an order deny-
ing Appellant's Motion for New Trial, etc. 
The order was entered by the clerk in the 
docket sheet. Copies were mailed by the clerk 
to all counsel on 09-24-85. 
Reporter'' s 
Transcript 
of Proceed-
ings pp. 
1-50. 
R. 110-113 
R. 114-118 
R. 119-122 
R. 123-130 
U.R.A.P. 4b 
Reporter's 
transcript 
pp. 51-60 
R. 136 
10-23-85 (Right to Appeal Judge Sawaya's Order of 
of 09-23-85 expires) 
U.R.A.P. 4 
04-19-86 Monte Tipton filed his Notice of Appeal from 
the Order of Judge Sawaya of 09-23-85. 
(Notice untimely). 
05-20-86 Counsel for Respondent Celia Tipton filed a 
second Order, signed by Judge Sawaya, dupli-
cating the Order of Judge Sawaya of 9-23-85. 
R. 144 
R. 149 
B-2 
06-13-86 Petitioner Monte Tipton.filed his Amended R. 151 
Notice of Appeal from both Judge Sawaya's 
personally prepared order of 09-23-85 and 
the redundant Order prepared by Respondent's 
Counsel of 05-20-86. (Notice untimely.) 
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